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Abstract Railway transport system (RTS) failures exert
enormous strain on end-users and operators owing to in-
service reliability failure. Despite the extensive research on
improving the reliability of RTS, such as signalling, tracks,
and infrastructure, few attempts have been made to develop
an effective optimisation model for improving the relia-
bility, and maintenance of rolling stock subsystems. In this
paper, a new hybrid model that integrates reliability, risk,
and maintenance techniques is proposed to facilitate
engineering failure and asset management decision analy-
sis. The upstream segment of the model consists of risk and
reliability techniques for bottom-up and top-down failure
analysis using failure mode effects and criticality analysis
and fault tree analysis, respectively. The downstream seg-
ment consists of a (1) decision-making grid (DMG) for the
appropriate allocation of maintenance strategies using a
decision map and (2) group decision-making analysis for
selecting appropriate improvement options for subsystems
allocated to the worst region of the DMG map using the
multi-criteria pairwise comparison features of the analyti-
cal hierarchy process. The hybrid model was illustrated
through a case study for replacing an unreliable pneumatic
brake unit (PBU) using operational data from a UK-based
train operator where the frequency of failures and delay
minutes exceeded the operator’s original target by 300%
and 900%, respectively. The results indicate that the novel
hybrid model can effectively analyse and identify a new
PBU subsystem that meets the operator’s reliability, risk,
and maintenance requirements.
Keywords Hybrid model  Reliability  Risk 
Maintenance  Railway rolling stock  Pneumatic brake unit
1 Introduction
Typical railway transport systems (RTSs) comprise com-
plex interconnected components that are often expected to
operate at significantly high levels of reliability to meet the
ever-growing expectations of passengers, operators, and
regulators [1–3]. However, despite the introduction of
generic reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
(RAMS) guidance standards such as EN50126 for
enhancing the interoperability, reliability, and safety of
railway systems, trains continue to suffer costly delays,
cancellations, and technical failures. Although mainte-
nance continues to be the natural remedy for identifying
and rectifying such failures, it often exerts a considerable
strain on operational budgets [1, 2]. For instance, Liden [4]
reported that the estimated annual combined RTS mainte-
nance budget of the European Union member countries
typically is between 12.8 and 21.3 billion Great British
Pound (GBP£) per 300,000 km of rail track. Despite sig-
nificant progress in incorporating reliability, risk, and
maintenance in RTSs, most of these applications are used
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where the limitations of one technique are compensated by
the strength of another [3, 5–15]. Such individualised
reliability, risk and maintenance techniques also contribute
to the issues and conflicts in decision-making between RTS
designers, operators, and suppliers [1, 2]. Thus, ineffective
decision-making regarding maintenance improvement has
negative consequence on system availability and through-
put irrespective of the inherent design reliability charac-
teristics [6, 7, 14, 15].
While these discrete risk- and reliability-centred
approaches, including failure mode effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA), fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree
analysis (ETA), and reliability block diagram (RBD),
provide useful theoretical constructs towards the under-
standing of the causal relationships between failures, they
can be unidirectional, as they primarily focus on failure
identification and do not directly contribute to identifying
appropriate maintenance strategies. The objective of this
paper is to introduce a new hybrid model for RTSs that
integrates reliability, risk, and maintenance strategy
selection and can be adopted by the RTS designers, oper-
ators, and suppliers in the three main life cycle phases
(design, operation, and maintenance).
2 Literature Review
Studies conducted by Stephen and Labib [13] on hybrid
model for learning from failures and Yunusa-Kaltungo
et al. [14] on the investigation of critical failures using
combinations of root case analysis techniques emphasise
that the isolated application of individual approaches limits
the ability to apply the strengths of some tools to com-
pensate for the limitations of others. From a practical
standpoint, the application of conventional risk and relia-
bility assessment tools such as FMECA and RBD analysis
for optimising RTS operations have been explored by
several researchers, including analysis of domino effect in
process industry using ETA by Alileche et al. [10], ETA
for flood protection by Rosqvist et al. [6] and linking risk
analysis to safety management by Trbojevic [7]. A fun-
damental strength of these tools is their simplicity, user-
friendliness, and, most importantly, versatility in terms of
applicability to various types of industry. Examples of the
discretised application of these tools to RTSs include the
development of a systematic approach for assessing haz-
ards and human failures in train control systems by Renjith
et al. [16], determination and validation of the barriers to
failure prevention in RTSs using FTA, Haddon’s ten
energy-based injury prevention approaches by Li et al.
[17], and risk evaluation of railway rolling stock failures
using FMECA technique by Dinmohammadi et al. [3].
Similarly, decision-making grid (DMG) for maintenance
selection and strategy allocation has been applied by
researchers’ in various disciplines, and the accuracy
depends on the quality of data utilised for the horizontal
boundaries of the decision map [18–20]. The Analytical
hierarchy process (AHP) has been applied discretely to
analyse complex projects and dynamic problems using
multicriteria decision analysis [21, 22]. The perceived
weakness of AHP lies within the consistency of results
under different questions, even if the goal or target remains
the same as demonstrated by Kamal et al. [23] in their
study on the application of AHP in project management.
However, several of these shortcomings have been ade-
quately addressed by Saaty [24] where AHP was used to
provide a flexible, systematic, and repeatable evaluation
process for selecting optimal alternatives amidst multiple
criteria.
Nystrom and Soderholm [25] attempted to address these
shortfalls by proposing an RTS maintenance decision-
making framework that uses AHP for prioritising com-
peting maintenance initiatives. Similar integrated
approaches using fuzzy FTA analysis with AHP have been
proposed to address reliability issues in the railway
industry [26, 27]. In Huang et al. [26], maximum proba-
bilities of railway system traffic failure were identified
using predefined alternative fuzzy sets, while Song et al.
[27] identified the maximum probability of railway system
traffic failures using predefined alternative fuzzy sets. For
addressing maintenance issues, the rolling stock sector is
adopting proactive techniques such as reliability-centred
maintenance (RCM); however, in most cases such mea-
sures are implemented after the design stage, thereby
increasing the implementation cost [28]. Following the
realisation that some of these tools can extend to approa-
ches beyond failure identification, there has been further
exploration towards improving RTS safety and overall
performance [28–31]. The RCM-based studies focussed on
the identification and ranking of high-impact failure modes
(FMs) associated with RTS components to improve
maintenance decision-making. Although these RCM-based
studies have improved the ability of railway industry
maintenance and operations managers to direct scarce
resources to areas in which they might be most needed,
holistic asset management frameworks should be capable
of modelling the fundamental events that trigger such FMs
in addition to the causal relationships between them.
Furthermore, hybrid frameworks proposed by Stephen
and Labib [13] and Sargent and Hall [32] in the context of
operations engineering can be fundamentally grouped into
two classes—hybrid models and hybrid modelling—based
on the use of models and output procedures, and their
corresponding applications, respectively. The focus of this
paper is primarily on hybrid models in which the outputs
from one tool/technique systematically form inputs of
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another. Additionally, studies such as Stephen and Labib
[13] on a hybrid model for failure analysis, Labib and Read
[33] on learning from failures, and Sargent and Hall [32]
regarding the historical view of hybrid simulation and
analytic models have attempted to identify the key drivers
for the application of hybrid models to industrial research.
Based on the premise that the management of industrial
failures and selection of cost-effective maintenance
strategies together account for a significant proportion of
overall downtime [34], our primary objective was to create
an approach that simplifies the process of managing these
issues by capitalising on the strengths of existing tools to
ease their deployment and acceptance by industry. Other
attempts aimed at applying hybrid models consisting of
two or more techniques include Yunusa-Kaltungo et al.
[14] for investigating the critical failures using root cause
analysis with FTA and RBD, Zubair et al. [35] on nuclear
accident precursors using AHP and Bayesian network
models, the proposal of Ishizaka and Labib [36] for a
hybrid integrated approach using FTA and AHP to analyse
disaster prevention, and the work of Appoh et al. [37] on
the hybrid dynamic probability model for complex train
failure analysis using Bayesian network and Petri nets. A
significant number of existing hybrid models focus pri-
marily on learning from failure and on accident investi-
gation. While such approaches are central to continuous
improvement in all fields, including reliability and asset
management, the obtained output is generally a set of
action plans that do not necessarily iterate the decision-
making stage of the process. Additionally, such hybrid
approaches are often restricted to two or possibly three
methods, while our approach involves the seamless appli-
cation of multiple tools while explaining the usefulness of
each.
Our review of the literature on integrated reliability,
risk, and maintenance selection techniques revealed a lack
of in-depth studies on the interdependency between these
strategies at the design phase to ensure the holistic
dependability assessment of rolling stock systems. There-
fore, our emphasis in this study was not to introduce
entirely new tools but instead to propose a novel approach
that integrates discrete reliability, risk, and maintenance
tools into a single optimised holistic framework. In addi-
tion to enabling synergy among individual tools, the pro-
posed integrated framework can potentially help reduce the
incidence of diagnosed faults in complex rolling stock
systems and improve the decision-making element of
maintenance downtime through the conventional serial
application of different techniques. Thus, this paper adds
two fundamental contributions to the existing research on
hybrid models for reliability, risk, and maintenance opti-
misation for RTS: first, it provides an improved approach
for evaluating reliability and risk using FMECA and FTA,
and simultaneously assigns maintenance strategies through
the use of a decision-making grid (DMG) as part of a single
framework for assessing subsystems early in their design
phase; second, the model provides an opportunity to
identify actions to improve subsystems allocated to
important regions of the maintenance decision map via
AHP pairwise comparison features that take both compet-
ing factors and constraints in the organisation into account.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 3 provides a description of the proposed hybrid
model demonstrating the integration of its upstream relia-
bility and risk assessment methods with its downstream
maintenance decision-making method. In Sect. 4, we pre-
sent a practical demonstration of the functioning of the
model using real-life PBU data provided by a UK train
operator. Finally, Sect. 5 provides the conclusion and dis-
cusses potential future work.
3 Proposed RTS Hybrid Model
A flowchart of the proposed framework is shown in Fig. 1.
The upstream segment relates to system decomposition,
risk, and reliability assessments through FMECA and FTA
techniques, while the downstream segment focuses on
decision-making using DMG for the initial allocation of
maintenance strategies and further analysis using AHP to
assign improvement actions to subsystems in the worst
region of the decision map. Both upstream and downstream
elements could be applied in isolation, depending on the
technical requirements of the system under study. In
specific cases, when only reliability and risk requirements
need to be considered, the upstream element is applied.
Where prior allocated asset management strategies for the
subsystems are deemed desirable within the first phase of
the downstream element (i.e., maintenance allocation),
then further analysis to identify improvement actions for
the subsystems may not be required. The model can be
applied by the RTS vehicle designers, original equipment
manufacturers and suppliers, and train operators as a con-
tinuous improvement model.
3.1 Input Data for the Hybrid Model
Existing RTS subsystems, which require an upgrade or
modification, can use historical data from the maintenance
management system (MMS) as a foundation for analysis,
as shown in Fig. 1. For a new subsystem without MMS
data, information obtained from similar existing systems
and technical design specifications can serve as the basis
for the analysis. FMs and failure rates data obtained from
the FMECA analysis will serve as the input data to the
FTA. Design information, failure rate, and schematics will
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Fig. 1 Conceptual flowchart of the proposed RTS hybrid model
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also provide additional input data for the qualitative and
quantitative FTA. The input data for the DMG, such as
failure frequency and delay minutes, can be obtained from
the existing MMS data. Besides, purchasing information,
and repair and planning data can equally serve as the input
data to the DMG. For novel subsystems without historical
data, data from a similarly configured subsystem and
intended mission profile information can form the DMG
input data. Finally, the data, project goals, improvement
alternatives, and criteria for the AHP will be established by
the RTS design project team as part of the brainstorming
exercise, elicitation, or facilitation processes. The input
data for developing the DMG criteria can come from the
MMS data. The improvement options or alternatives can be
established by key stakeholders in the RTS project team.
3.2 Processing Procedures for the Proposed Hybrid
Model
The proposed hybrid modelling process can be categorised
into four main steps:
Step 1: Subsystem definition and failure modes
classification
This stage involves establishing component functions,
functional failures, and corresponding FMs and their
effects on the entire subsystem under study [3] as shown in
step 1(a). In this study, the emphasis is on the risk priority
number (RPN). The objective of this step is to define and
identify all critical FMs based on RPN as part of criticality
analysis. Here, we denote a FM k within a subsystem j by
FMkj. Each FMkj is assigned an RPN based on estimation
of its severity (Skj), occurrence (Okj), and detectability
(Dkj), as follows:
RPNkj ¼ Skj  Okj  Dkjk ¼ 1; . . .;m; j ¼ 1; . . .; nk ð1Þ
where k represents the first failure mode from k ¼ 1 to last
failure mode m and j represents the first subsystem from
j ¼ 1 to the last subsystem j ¼ nk:
RPN is assigned to each FM identified as part of the
FMECA process. For mission-critical systems in which
detectability (DkjÞ forms an integral component of severity







Thus, Okj of the RPNkj is evaluated by selecting the fre-
quency rating in column 1 using the range of predicted
failure rate in column 2, as shown in Table 1. Similarly, the
severity level Skj is selected from Table 2 in row 2 based on
the consequence of the failure. RPNkj is then estimated
using Eq. (2) where Dkj is considered as part of Skj for
mission-critical systems.
The next stage in step 1(b) of Fig. 1 is to determine the
overall subsystem risk level based on the overall compo-
nent failure mode. The overall railway rolling stock sub-
system risk level (Tkj) can be obtained by evaluating
overall component failure frequency level (Fkj) in the
vertical axis on a scale of one (very unlikely) to six (fre-
quent) and overall severity level (Hkj) in the horizontal axis
for the subsystem on a scale of one (insignificant) to four
(catastrophic), using Eq. (3) and the ranking in Table 3
[39]:
Table 1 Failure mode frequency rating derived from EN 50126 [39]
Rating Frequency/hour Description of frequency classes
10 Frequent F[ 10 - 1/h Likely to occur frequently. The hazard will be continually experienced
8–9 Probable 10 - 3/h\F B 10 - 1/h Will occur several times. The hazard can be expected to occur often
6–7 Occasional 10 - 5/
h\F B 10 - 3/h
Likely to occur several times. The hazard can be expected to occur several times
4–5 Remote 10 - 7/h\F B 10 - 5/h Likely to occur sometimes in the system life cycle. The hazard can reasonably be expected to
occur
2–3 Improbable 10 - 9/
h\F B 10 - 7/h
Unlikely to occur but possible. It can be assumed that the hazard may occur as an exception
1 Highly improbable F B 10 - 9/h Extremely unlikely to occur. It can be assumed that the hazard may not occur
Table 2 Failure mode severity rating derived from EN 50126 [39]
Very
high
High Moderate Marginal Low
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1







k ¼ 1; . . .;m; j ¼ 1; . . .;wk ð3Þ
where k represents the first overall component’s frequency
and severity from k ¼ 1 to the last overall component’s
frequency and severity m, and j represents the number of
overall components within the subsystems from the first
overall component j ¼ 1 to the last overall component j ¼
nk: Note that the risk matrix may represent different scales
for different organisations based on the frequency of asset
failures and their severities. The overall component failure
rate is assessed based on the individual failure mode failure
frequency. Similarly, the overall severity level is assessed
on the basis of the combined impact of the individual
failure mode severity.
Step 2: Determination of failure causal relationships and
overall reliability
Step 2 of the hybrid model deals with the estimation of
failure rate and reliability. The most critical FMkj are used
as inputs to the FTA, which illustrate the logical relation-
ship between the top failure event (overall failure rate) and
provides an alternative means of investigating failures [38].
Assuming that all failure events are statistically indepen-
dent, the probability of the top event (TE) failure in the
FTA (i.e., P TEð Þ) is given by [40–42];








In (4) and (5), each basic event from i to n is modelled
using OR-gate and AND-gate, respectively. Despite the
known versatility of FTA, it is quite common for it to be
merged with RBD to produce a simplified graphical rep-
resentation of a system and directly obtain its success
probability [33, 41]. For a series configuration with sta-
tistical independence of events, where a failure of any
component within the subsystem can result in downtime,
the output of an OR-gate corresponds to a series system
with a series of independent basic event probabilities Pi for
events i to t. Here, the probability of failure PF can be
estimated as
PF ¼ 1 
Yt
i¼1
1  Pið Þi ¼ 1; . . .; t ð6Þ
The mean failure rate k and repair rate l for a series RTS
subsystem in which basic events from i to t, assumed to
















The output event of an OR-gate for a series-connected
subsystem can then be estimated as [40]
PF ¼
k










Similarly, the repair rate l and failure rate k of a parallel
configuration subsystem can be used to estimate the output

























l 6 Frequent Undesirable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable5 Probable Tolerable Undesirable Intolerable Intolerable
4 Occasional Tolerable Undesirable Undesirable Intolerable
3 Remote Negligible Tolerable Undesirable Undesirable
2 Improbable Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
1 Very Unlikely Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
Insignificant Marginal Critical Catastrophic
1 2 3 4
Severity level 










With Eqs. (6)–(13), the overall failure rate and thus relia-
bility of the subsystem can be estimated, as shown in step 2
of Fig. 1. The basic symbols for FTA are shown in Table 4.
Step 3: Maintenance allocation DMG
The third stage of the hybrid model involves the selection
of appropriate maintenance strategies using the DMG. This
process is undertaken considering reliability and risk esti-
mates as well as operational factors, financial information,
and train information using data from MMS [step
3(a) Fig. 1)]. This stage involves the application of clus-
tering analysis over a distance interval that allows for equal
and robust criteria measurements for the two selected
rankings of factors that most impact the RTS subsystem
[43]. For maximum Xmax and minimum values Xmin, the
ranges of the three criteria for the two ranking factors as
indicated in step 3(b) are estimated as follows:
Highcriterion ¼ Xmaxð Þ; Xmax 
Xmax  Xmin
3
   
ð14Þ
where Highcriterion ranges from the small value of
Xmax  XmaxXmin3
 	 
to the large value of Xmaxð Þ









   ð15Þ
where Mediumcriterion ranges from the small value of
Xmax  2 XmaxXmin3
 	 
to the large value of
Xmax  XmaxXmin3
 	 







where Lowcriterion ranges from the small value of Xminð Þ to
the large value of Xmax  2 XmaxXmin3
 	 
.
The output of the DMG is a tri-quadrant decision map,
in which the respective segments represent the defined
asset management strategies for the organisation. Each
organisation can define unique asset management strategies
relevant to the operation of the RTS subsystem. Here, the
following strategies were adopted for the decision map;
breakdown maintenance (BM), planned preventive main-
tenance (PPM), condition-based maintenance (CBM), skill
level upgrade (SLU), and design out maintenance (DOM),
as shown in Fig. 2 [18, 44].
This map is usually constructed using a combination of
data measured in relation to the key performance drivers
relating to the railway operation—in this case, failure fre-
quency and delay minutes originating from MMS. The
three criteria will form the tri-quadrant axes for the DMG
decision map, as shown in Fig. 2 and as illustrated in the
model [step 3(c) Fig. 1]. The boundary measurements for
the homogenous criteria drivers are equally partitioned to
enable holistic capturing of the extremes in the measure-
ment data, as shown in Eqs. (14)–(16) and indicated in step
3(d) of the proposed model.
Step 4: Maintenance improvement by AHP
The fourth and final step in the hybrid model involves
the selection of improvement options through multi-criteria
decision-making method (MCDM) where improvement
options are selected for the worst regions, i.e., subsystems
located on the far-right corner of the decision map, such as
DOM in Fig. 2. The following steps explain AHP as a
method for MCDM [45–47]:
i. Establish the goal, that is the first layer, for
maintenance improvement with the RTS project
team and stakeholders as indicated in step 4(a).
ii. Define and organise the criteria m as shown in step
4(b) by clustering them under different hierarchy
levels using key performance indicators defined by
the RTS project team or from the MMS data.
iii. Identify the maintenance improvement options or
alternatives n. The RTS project team or key stake-
holders will score the alternative n against the




Top or intermediate event
OR-gate
Fig. 2 Typical DMG showing different maintenance strategies and
their boundaries
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criteria m. A ratio wi=wj which is the weight of
alternative i to j is assigned to criteria m to reflect the
relative importance of the decision. Thus, the
decision maker, normally the RTS project manager,
will create judgement matrix m mð Þ with a
dimension of ðn nÞ alternative for pairwise com-
parison aij which is an approximation of the ratio
wi=wj. The value assigned to aij is typically in the
interval ½1=9; 9: The estimated weight vector w is
found by solving the following eigenvector problem:
AW¼kmaxW ð17Þ
where kmax is the principal eigenvalue for the pair-
wise comparison matrix A,
A ¼
   C1 C2 . . . Cn
C1 w1=w1 w1=w2 . . . w1=wn
C2 w2=w1 . . . . . . . . .





C1; . . .;Cn where n 2 criteria.
iv. Next, the consistency index (CI) is determined by
computing AW and approximating the minimum
eigenvalue, kmax as kmax  nð Þ= n 1ð Þ, where n is
the matrix size as indicated in step 4(c). The
consistency ratio (CR), which is a test for reliability
of consistency, for a given reciprocal matrix can be
obtained by estimating the ratio of CI to the average
random consistency index (RI) as shown in Table 5.
The pairwise comparisons in a judgement matrix are
considered adequate if the corresponding CR is less
than 10% [45–47]. It is a feedback to the decision
makers to capture logical and reasonable preferences
when making judgements. Table 6 illustrates the
fundamental scale of relative importance.
v. The last step of the AHP process, as shown in step
4(d) of Fig. 1, is to conduct group decision-making
to select an alternative option to improve the
maintenance of the RTS subsystems. To ensure a
coherent approach to decision-making and agree-
ment within the group regarding the decision in the
context of AHP, particularly in an RTS organisation
that comprises various disciplines and experts,
Shannon entropy H (where H can be interpreted as
a measure of evenness of priorities among the
criteria for individual decision makers) is proposed
[49]. Shannon alpha and beta entropies for N criteria
and K decision makers represent the mean Shannon







pi2 þ . . . ð18Þ
where pi denotes the calculated priorities for criteria
i ¼ 1 to N. Assuming equal weights
w1 ¼ w2 ¼ wk ¼ 1=K, then the effective number of
criteria for Eq. (18) is represented by Da ¼ expHa.
We can estimate the Shannon gamma diversity Hc





þ   Þ ln w1pi1 þ w2pi2 þ   ð Þ ð19Þ
Assuming equal weights w1 ¼ w2 ¼ wk ¼ 1=K, the
effective number of criteria (true gamma diversity of
order one) is Dc ¼ expHc. The difference between
Hc and Ha is the beta diversity Hb, which is equiv-
alent to the true beta diversity of order one as
Db ¼ Dc=Da. True beta has a maximum diversity
equivalent to N; the minimum is one, which means
there is no variation between the decision makers. To
measure the consensus indicator for group decision
Table 5 Random consistency index (RI) [42]
Size of matrix 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RI 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49




1 Equal importance Two activities contribute equally to the objective
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgement slightly favour one activity over another
5 Strong importance Experience and judgement strongly favour one activity over another
7 Very strong An activity is favoured very strong over another: its dominance demonstrated
in practice
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring one activity over another has the highest possible
order of affirmation
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values between the two
adjacent values
When a compromise in judgement is needed
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makers, a new homogeneity index M, which is a
reciprocal of Db, is introduced as M ¼ Da=Dc. This
can be transformed into a relative index of homo-
geneity to measure the consensus indicator in the
range from zero to unity [49–51]:
S ¼ 1=Db  Damin=Dcmax
 
= 1  Damin=Dcmax
 
ð20Þ
If Damin ¼ 1 and Dcmax ¼ N, Eq. (20) can be trans-
formed as follows:
S ¼ 1=Db  1=N
 
1  1=Nð Þ ð21Þ
Thus, the relative index of homogeneity S can be consid-
ered as a consensus indicator. When the priorities of all the
decision makers are completely distinct, it is zero, and it is
one (unity) when the priorities of all the participants are
identical. In addition, when decision makers give full
preference to one criterion, the alpha entropy is minimum.
In that case, the outcome from the pairwise comparisons of
N criteria is equivalent to M=ðN þM  1Þ for the selected
criterion with a remainder of N  1ð Þ priorities equal to
1=ðN þM  1Þ. Hence, the minimum and maximum alpha




N þM  1 ln
M
N þM  1
 
 N  1
N þM  1 ln
1
N þM  1 ð22Þ
Hcmax ¼ N  Kð Þ 
1
N þM  1 ln
1
N þM  1
 
 K þM  1






K þM  1
N þM  1
  
ð23Þ
The new AHP consensus indicator for effective group
decision-making is estimated by transforming Eqs. (22)
and (23) into a form similar to that of Eq. (20) by using Da
and Dc to keep the indicator in the range from 0 to 1 as
follows:
S ¼ 1=Db  Damin=Dcmax

 




The AHP consensus indicator S can be interpreted as
shown in Table 7.
Steps i to v are repeated until a requisite improvement
alternative is obtained and implemented. In this study,
using an online AHP software, three senior management
team members from the train operator (senior project
manager, procurement manager, operations manager) and
three senior management team members from the PBU
manufacturer (assurance manager, mechanical design
manager, electrical design manager) constituted the group
decision makers [52].
In this section, we presented a systematic guide on how
to use the proposed hybrid model to assess the overall risk
and reliability and allocate appropriate maintenance
strategies at different life cycle stages of the rolling stock
subsystem. This approach, particularly the downstream
segment, is not based on a one-stop principle. Rather, the
framework will achieve maximum benefit if it is adopted as
a means of producing continuous improvement in which
the overall goal is for components to move as close as
possible to the low-low region of the decision map. In the
next section, we present a case study in which the proposed
framework is implemented using real-life RTS data.
4 Case Study
To demonstrate the applicability and sequence of imple-
mentation of the proposed hybrid framework, we consider
a case study based on an ongoing project for the design and
delivery of new pneumatic brake units (PBUs) to replace
the unreliable PBUs in an in-service electrical multiple-unit
(EMU) rolling stock (RS) operation for a train operator in
the UK. As a measurement of failure rate, the desired
operator PBU reliability requirement is 1:607  105 per
hour equivalent to one failure in 62,227 h with a maximum
allowable overall risk that should be tolerable, thus, as low
as reasonably practicable. The current PBU failure rate was
estimated as 5:558  105 per hour, indicating that there
was a failure every 17,992 h of train operation. The
existing PBU reliability led to approximate delay impact
minutes and service-affecting failures of 1002 min and 203
failures over 3 years. This was far below the operational
requirements of one failure in every 62,227 h
(i.e.,1:607  105 perhourÞ of train operation. Delay
impact minutes occur when the train fails to recover during
the first 3 minutes of technical failure in passenger service,
and the associated failure after 3 minutes is referred to as
the service-affecting failure. As part of the design process,
it is also necessary to establish and allocate all the appro-
priate maintenance strategies for the PBU components to
ensure optimum customer operational requirements that
avoid unnecessary train delays due to PBU failures.
Table 7 AHP consensus indicator
S Very low Low Moderate High Very high
Consensus B 50% 50–65% 65–75% 75–85% C 85%
Urban Rail Transit (2021) 7(2):139–157 147
123
4.1 Case Study Background
The RS operation employs dual-voltage EMUs that use
25-kV AC overhead and 750-V DC power supplies from
the third rail. An analysis of the 3-year historical data
obtained from the MMS revealed that the PBUs represent
one of the worst-performing subsystems in terms of service
reliability and delay minutes, as shown in Fig. 3. During
this period, the maintenance and delay impact minute costs
to the operator owing to PBU failure were £3,153,689.34
and £1,056,000, respectively, and exceeded the operator’s
penalty cost budgets by 315% and 956%, respectively. The
critical components considered for the PBU module com-
prises a non-return valve (NRV) assembly, a main air
compressor (MAC), a flexible delivery hose (FDH), a brake
control unit (BCU), and an air filter (AF). The BCU is
further divided into a relay valve (RV), check valve (CV),
magnet valve (MV), and pressure governor (PG). The PBU
stores compressed air in a dedicated reservoir that is pro-
tected from the main air reservoir pipe (MRP) pressure
losses by a non-return valve (NRV). Fig. 4 shows a high-
level schematic of a PBU and its associated components
(note not all components are shown). The total annual
distance of 150,000 km at an average speed of 24.5 km/h
(with a top speed of 60 km/h) for the train is considered.
4.2 Analysis, Discussion, and Implementation
The process commenced with the collection of historical
and operational data from the train operator’s railway
rolling stock MMS database as depicted in Fig. 1. The
FMECA for a subsystem was first conducted to identify the
PBU subsystem FMs along with their corresponding RPNs,
failure rates, and their effects on the subsystem as shown in
step 1(a) of the model depicted in Fig. 1. The failure rate
for each FM was estimated as per Table 8, which was then
used to extrapolate the frequency of occurrence ðOkjÞ for
each FM using Table 1. Appendix A sets out the basis for
the quantitative FM and the overall failure rate estimations.
Furthermore, severity rating, Skj; for each FM was
extrapolated from Table 2. The RPNkj was estimated for
each component of the PBU using Eq. (2) based on the
established severity and frequency rating values as per
Table 8. MAC FMs (overheat compressor and filter passing
contaminated air) including FDH (minor atmospheric
leakage) and BCU magnetic valve error (no opening)
failure modes were noted to have significantly elevated
RPNs of eight as depicted in Table 8. Although MAC and
FDH FMs have the same RPN, the overall risk and con-
sequence of each component failure is not the same. Next,
the overall PBU risk (Tkj) was estimated using the railway
risk matrix as per Table 3, following Eq. (3) and by
extrapolating the component levels for Fkj and Hkj. As
shown in Table 9, the overall component failure frequency
level Fkj (estimated based on the overall failure rates
described in Appendix B) for the MAC and FDH were
evaluated as level 3 (remote), followed by AF with level 2
(improbable), and NRV and BCU with level 1 (very unli-
kely). Similarly, the overall component severity levels Hkj
for subsystems MAC, NRV, FDH, and AF were all
Fig. 3 EMU train subsystem performance based on delay minutes and failure frequency
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evaluated as level 2 (marginal), in which the failure of a
given subsystem can lead to the functional reduction of the
PBU. In contrast, Hkj of the BCU was determined to be
level 3 (critical) and can potentially cause a complete
functional loss of the entire PBU. Thus, at an overall
subsystem failure frequency level 3 (remote) and a failure
severity level 2 (marginal), the overall PBU risk level Tkj
could be classified as tolerable, indicating that the PBU
Table 8 PBU component failure modes and estimated failure rates
Subsystem
failure mode










Compressor overheat 3.033E-06 4 2 8 F1 4.42E-06
Filter passing contaminated
air
1.517E-06 4 2 8 F2
NRV function
loss (M2)
Fails to close 3.04E-08 2 2 4 F3 3.51E-08
Leaks to atmosphere 4.68E-09 2 2 2 F4
FDH function
error (M3)
Minor leakage to atmosphere 8.87E-06 4 2 8 F5 9.24E-06
Critical leakage to the
atmosphere at start-up
9.54E-07 3 2 6 F6
AF function loss
(M4)
Leaks to atmosphere 4.77E-07 3 2 6 F7 5.10E-07
Stuck open 3.41E-08 2 2 4 F8
BCU function
loss (M5)
Relay valve error (M6) Air leakage 3.75E-09 2 2 4 F9 6.16E-15
Extreme air leakage 1.88E-08 2 2 4 F10
Check valve error (M7) No opening 2.048E-07 3 2 6 F11
No closing 2.048E-07 3 2 6 F12
Magnet valve error (M8) Air leakage 6.10E-07 3 2 6 F13
No opening 4.27E-06 4 2 8 F14
Pressure governor error (M9) Air leakage 7.00E-08 2 2 4 F15
No switching 7.00E-08 2 2 4 F16
Fig. 4 A simple schematic diagram of a PBU subsystem
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design has a tolerable risk level that meets the operator’s
requirements. The summary of RPN, failure rates, and risk
results, as illustrated in steps 1(a) and 1(b) (Fig. 1), are
shown in Tables 8 and 9.
Next, the logical relationship between the top and basic
events including the prediction of overall failure rate and
reliability by FTA was conducted as per step 2 of Fig. 1. As
shown in Fig. 5, the TE, Full-service braking error of the
train, can occur whenever any of the five subsystems fail.
The FTA was constructed based on the FMECA informa-
tion from Table 8. The failure rates (for each failure mode)
shown in Table 8 were estimated using historical data from
the MMS as part of the analysis in step 1 (Appendix B).
Thus, the TE is connected by OR-gates to the lower failure
events ðM1;M2;M3;M4, and M5Þ: The MAC function loss
M1 has two failure causes ðF1;F2Þ and cannot operate if
either of the basic events ðF1orF2Þ occurs; therefore, it is
also connected to these events via an OR-gate. Similarly,
the NRV, FDH, and AF function losses M2, M3, and M4,
respectively, are connected to their respective failure cau-
ses by OR-gates. The BCU function loss M5 has four
intermediate events ðM6;M7;M8;M9Þ and fails to function
only if all four intermediate events fail simultaneously;
therefore, it is connected to these events through an AND-
gate. The RV error M6 occurs if any of its failure causes
ðF9orF10Þ occur and, therefore, has an OR-gate connec-
tion, as do the CV, MV, and PG errors, M7, M8; and M9;
respectively. From Eqs. (4)–(13) and the rules of Boolean
algebra [36, 37], a total of 24 minimal cut sets (MCSs)
were identified (including eight single-point and 16
quadruple-point failures), and an overall failure rate esti-
mate of 1:385  105perhour (which adequately exceeds
the initially prescribed operator requirement of 1:607 
105 perhour) was derived as indicated in step 2 of Fig. 1.
The overall FTA diagram is shown in Fig. 5. With the
expected reliability of one failure in every 72,202 hours of
operation compared to the customer’s original requirement
of one every 62,227 h (1:607  105 perhour), a further
16.03% increase in reliability was demonstrated. More-
over, the current failure rate of 5:558  105 per hour
indicates a significant reliability increase of 301%. The
increase in reliability can be demonstrated as an equivalent
improvement in the delay minutes (from 1003 to 101 min)
and a reduction in service-affecting failures (from 203 to
51 failures). Assuming that labour, spare parts, and logistic
delay costs remain relatively constant, the forecasted fail-
ure rate indicates cost savings of approximately 16.03%
over the desired customer reliability target and 301% over
the existing unreliable PBU. Even under worst-case eco-
nomic scenarios whereby high inflation rates are applied to
labour, spare parts, and logistic delay costs, the new and
enhanced reliability will still yield optimum cost savings
over the existing PBU.
Using Eqs. (14)–(16), the intervals for both criteria (fail-
ure frequency and delay impact minutes from the MMS data)
were determined as shown in step 3(a) of Fig. 1. For the
failure frequency criterion, estimated high, medium, and low
intervals of {30, 44}, {16, 30}, and {3, 16}, respectively,
were obtained; for delay minutes, the corresponding esti-
mated intervals were {64, 79}, {49, 64}, and {5, 49},
respectively. Thus, the frequency criterion range was esti-
mated to be between 3 and 44, while the delay minute range
was determined to be between 5 and 49. Figure 6 shows an
extract of the decision map for selected components as
illustrated in steps 3(b) and 3(c) of Fig. 1. It is seen that AF,
NRV, PG, and CV are located within the BM quadrant owing
to their low-low combinations; MV and RV fall within the
PPM region owing to their medium-low combinations, while
BCU has a high-high combination, indicating that the DOM
strategy is most appropriate following step 3(d) (Fig. 1) of the
proposed model. Considering the criticality of this asset to
the client, and the fact that the BCU lies in the DOM region, a
further proposal to redesign and improve maintenance rou-
tines of the BCU by the RTS project management team using
the prescribed AHP decision-making approach for compar-
ison was considered.
For the final step considering the BCU maintenance
improvement as shown in step 4 of Fig. 1, the first three
hierarchies were identified: BCU maintenance improvement
(goal) as shown in step 4(a) of Fig. 1; availability and cost as
criteria from the project team (level two); software upgrade
(SU), reduced maintenance periodicity (RMP), and addi-
tional brake redundancy (level three) as shown in step 4(b) of
Fig. 1. The data for the AHP were obtained through a rig-
orous group decision process where aggregated weights for




Failure event Overall failure rate Fkj Hkj Risk level Tkj
Overall component level MAC(M1) 4.42E-06 Remote Marginal Tolerable
NRV(M2) 3.51E-08 Very unlikely Marginal Negligible
FDH(M3) 9.24E-06 Improbable Marginal Tolerable
AF(M4) 5.10E-07 Remote Marginal Tolerable
BCU(M5) 6.16E-15 Very unlikely Critical Negligible
Subsystem level PBU(TE) 1.385E205 Remote Marginal Tolerable
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criteria and alternatives were established as shown in
Appendix B (Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14) using Tables 5, 6, and
7. The synthesised pairwise comparison for the six decision
makers was conducted between the two main criteria in
terms of priority trade-off using Eqs. (17)–(23), where fleet
availability was maximised (69.6%) compared to the min-
imised cost (30.4%) with CR less than 10% and a very high
group consensus at 81.76%, as shown in Appendix B
(Table 11). However, further breakdown of the criteria
weight aggregation from Appendix B (Tables 12 and 13)
shows that all the decision makers regarded availability as
the most dominant criteria, except the procurement manager
who prioritised cost (66.7%) instead of availability (33.3%).
Similarly, the pairwise comparison was conducted for the
improvement alternatives using the priority list in Table 6
against the two consolidated criteria as shown in step 4(c) of
Fig. 1. The overall result indicated that the SU was the best
choice among the decision makers for the BCU maintenance
improvement with an overall consolidated global priority of
47.3% compared to ABR with 39.8% and the least viable
RMP with 12.7% with CR less than 10% and very high group
consensus at 91.4%, as shown in Appendix B (Table 14)
using Table 7 as shown in step 4(d) of Fig. 1. Additionally,
the results revealed that the SU as consensus choice had a
considerable impact on BCU maintenance improvement
strategy. The detailed analysis results, including breakdown
of the group participants’ decision-making aggregated
results and matrices based on each consolidated criterion and
alternative by the RTS project team with respect to the BCU
improvement, are shown in Appendix B (Tables 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17 and 18) (Fig. 7).
The results indicate the proposed hybrid model can
identify RTS subsystem overall risk level, reliability aspects,
and further BCU improvements that boosted the respective
Fig. 5 Pneumatic brake unit
fault tree diagram
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asset maintenance strategies toward the desirable low-low
region of the decision map. As noted above, the AHP results
revealed that SU was the most favoured option and therefore
is currently being implemented by the organisation across a
fleet of trains. Upon completion of the modification and
improvement needed to move the BCU to the desired region
of the decision map, maintenance plans and asset strategies
can then be stored in the MMS database for access and
implementation by engineers and technicians. When new or
significant historical data or changes in the use and operation
of the train are made available, the model can then be iterated
again to improve the reliability, risk, and maintenance of the
subsystem as part of the continuous improvement process
illustrated in steps 1–4 of Fig. 1. This hybrid approach is not
an end in itself; optimal benefits can only be achieved by
instituting it as a means of continuous improvement. Fur-
thermore, the overall goal should be constant migration to
and retention of all components within or as close as possible
to the low-low region of the decision map. Thus, it can be
constituted as a model capable of operating across the three
main life cycles of RTS.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduced a new hybrid model that considers
the upstream elements of reliability and risk assessment as
well as the downstream element of maintenance decision-
making techniques to improve the performance and main-
tenance strategy of an RTS PBU subsystem. Unlike pre-
vious maintenance improvement strategies that were purely
theoretical and therefore subject to bias, in this study, each
of the identified improvement actions (i.e., SU, ABR, and
RMP) were presented to a team of project stakeholders that
represented both the client and supplier to enable effective
group decision-making using AHP mathematical tech-
niques by the six senior management team members. The
proposed hybrid model offers the following significant
advantages relative to previous hybrid models:
• The model is practical in that it provides optimal cost
savings while ensuring RTS reliability and enables risk
analysis with respect to the simultaneous allocation of
appropriate asset management strategies for systems
Fig. 6 PBU components allocated to the decision-making grid
Fig. 7 Improvement selection hierarchy for the BCU
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and subsystems at the design phase of the product life
cycle.
• The model offers considerable benefits in terms of
enforcing alignment among different project teams in
coordinating their efforts at the early stages of product
development. This helps to balance the competing
factors of asset performance and risk and maintenance
requirements within a single framework, especially in
an RTS organisation.
• More importantly, the model allows for further
improvement of subsystems (such as DOM) allocated
to the high-high region of the decision map by using the
features of multi-criteria decision-making of AHP to
select alternatives improvement against criteria to
enable the identification of the best enhancement
strategy at an optimal cost.
• Finally, the new hybrid model provides robustness,
versatility, and compelling synthesis of practical engi-
neering approaches and academic rigour in evaluating
risk, reliability, and maintenance requirements as a
single entity at an opportune phase (design) including
other life cycle phases for an RTS asset. In this manner,
the proposed method provides a robust alternative to
RCM and other hybrid reliability and maintenance
models.
Although the model provides several advantages, the
availability of reliable and quality data, especially for novel
systems, and the effects of dynamic interaction between
subsystems of a complex system may serve as a limitation
for the holistic application of the proposed model. There-
fore, further study is recommended for a dynamic hybrid
model that considers additional factors such as multiple
failures with changing operational conditions for applica-
tions in complex systems such as RTS.
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Appendix A
This section describes the basis for estimating the indi-
vidual FMs and overall component failure rates. The
example described below represents the MAC function loss
(compressor overheat failure mode) and overall MAC
failure rate (M1) estimation (Table 8). Given the recorded
time-to-fail (TTF) data obtained from the MMS for the
compressor overheat component FM, as shown in Table 10,
the estimated failure data was determined using the Wei-
bull distribution [53]





where ni; . . .; nN represent the frequency of failures in this
case TTF, b is the shape parameter, and g is the
Table 10 Time-to-failure historical data for the compressors over-
heat failure mode



















Urban Rail Transit (2021) 7(2):139–157 153
123
characteristic life. With the 18 historical TTF data in
Table 10 and Eq. (25), the compressor overheat FM mean
time to failure (MTTF) was estimated as 330,058.708 h,
equivalent to a failure rate of k ¼ 3:033  106 per hour as
indicated in Table 8. Similarly, the filter passing contam-
inated air FM failure rate was estimated as 1:517  106
per hour using historical data from the MMS. Owing to the
series connection between the MAC’s (M1) compressor
overheat and filter passing contaminated as shown in
Fig. 5, the overall failure rate of the MAC can be estimated
using Eq. (7) as 4:42  106 per hour (Table 8). In this
study, the Isograph software was used to evaluate the
failure rates [54]. The same approach was used to assess
the component FMs and overall failure rates for the other
PBU components [NRV, FDH, AF and BCU, (Table 8)]. It
should be however noted that the BCU components are
connected in parallel, and therefore, the AND-gate
approach is considered for the overall failure rate assess-
ment. 8).
Appendix B
Synthesised pairwise comparison results using AHP
BPMSG software [52] for group decision making
(Tables 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18).
Table 12 Criteria weights assigned by all evaluators for fleet avail-
ability criterion
Evaluators Weight CR\ 0.1 OK
Operations manager 0.800 0.000
Procurement manager 0.333 0.000
Electrical design manager 0.750 0.000
Mechanical design manager 0.667 0.000
Assurance manager 0.750 0.000
Senior project manager 0.800 0.000
Table 13 Criteria weights assigned by all evaluators for cost criterion
Evaluators Weight CR\ 0.1 OK
Operations manager 0.200 0.000
Procurement manager 0.667 0.000
Electrical design manager 0.250 0.000
Mechanical design manager 0.333 0.000
Assurance manager 0.250 0.000
Senior project manager 0.200 0.000
Table 11 Criteria weights by
aggregate of all evaluators for
the two criteria
Criterion Local weight Global priority CR\ 0.1 OK AHP group consensus
Availability 0.696 0.696 0.000 0.817  High
Cost 0.304 0.304 0.000
Fig. 8 Failure rate estimation for the compressor overheat failure mode
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